R E V I S T A D E E S T U D I O S I N T E R N A C I O N A L E S

The growing trend to consider as customary law rules devised to support preferences and arguments, that cannot otherwise qualify as law, is leading to serious doubts about the real meaning of international law. This article examines the reasons behind this phenomenon and reflects on means for strengthening the traditional requirements of customary international law so as to ensure that proper law is made. It notes that customary international law cannot depend on the advancement of instrumental goals some times in contradiction with the requirements of a stable legal system. The articles examines in particular the meaning of States' practice and opinio juris, the traditional elements for the formation of customary rules. It argues in conclusion that the efforts at reengineering customary law have actually revived its role to an unexpected extent, to the point that the reaction against its manipulation is gradually bringing back international law to its normal balance.
CUSTOMIZING YOUR OWN NEEDS mong the many incisive remarks made by Sir Robert Jennings, there is one that stands up for its accuracy and reflection of current realities: " [m] ost of what we perversely persist in calling customary law is not only not customary law; it does not even faintly resemble a customary law"
1 . Yet, every passing day more and more purported rules are labelled customary law if this helps to support an argument that cannot otherwise be sustained under the law. What is most disquieting about this phenomenon is not that authors and govern- Teaching and Practice, 1982, 3-9, at 5 , and discussion by Martti Koskenniemi: "The Politics of International Law", European Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 1990, 4-32, at 27; and David P. Fidler: "Challenging the Classic Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law", German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 39, 1996, 198-248, at 225. ments tend to rely on such an approach, but that judges and practitioners have embarked in such an exercise too, prompting doubts about the very basis of international law.
Idealism needs to find a rule of law even where there is none.
Bad as this situation tends to be with respect to general issues of international law, it turns only worse in certain fields where idealism, and occasionally political interest, needs to find a rule of law even where there is none, or reach an interpretation of a rule that does not even remotely allow for such a development. A desired outcome is then substituted for the strict rule of law.
Fidler has put together an impressive account of authors who have warned about, or explained, this trend 2 . With respect to human rights, Simma and Alston, for -example, have noted an "identity crisis in customary law" because of the search for customary law wherever is needed 3 ; Henkin has remarked that most of human rights law cannot be identified with customary law since it does not derive from State practice or consent 4 ; and Sohn has also explained that States not even make the law on human rights as it emerges from people, scholars and law journals 5 . The situation is not very different in connection with international environmental law 6 or, more recently, as a tool for justifying the use of force in international affairs 7 . Why is this process gaining ground and how should the traditional requirements of customary international law be strengthened in order to ensure that proper law is made, are the main concerns that will be discussed in this contribution.
A first aspect that must be noted is that which an author has described as the "evaporation of law from international law" 8 . The concerns relating to the exag-gerated use of "soft law", package dealing, bargaining, settlement-type outcomes and other that author identifies, are not alien to this particular development 9
. Customary international law could not escape from a frame where regimes matter more than the law, international relations sideup with advocacy and at the very end what matters is to accomplish instrumental goals rather than count on a stable legal framework 10 . The politics underlying the different approaches to the sources of international law have also been well explained by Koskenniemi
11
. The increasing criticism of consensualism to justify the departure from State consent to ascertain the existence of a rule, explained by some concept of social necessity or by the resort to some form of tacit or presumed consent, even if wholly artificial, means that nonconsensualism becomes the desired outcome 12 . Again, customary law cannot escape from a setting where consent and State practice are not considered relevant for the determination of the legal norm, particularly when the identification of a rule of customary law is always surrounded by some degree of difficulty. One such mystery is, of course, how can a rule of law develop on more than one occasion from the violation of a pre-existing rule of law 15 might not be entirely shared. Indeed, the enactment of a 200-mile area of maritime jurisdiction, for example, was perceived by some as a violation of a rule on a restricted territorial sea and contiguous zone, but not by others who believed that resource-related jurisdiction was previously unknown under international law and hence there was no specific rule governing the matter in a way not dissimilar to what had happened with respect to continental shelf jurisdiction 16 . The end result, however, is that one way or the other the new rule became accepted and proclaimed as customary international law, thus superseding whatever there was or there was not earlier.
Customary
MICROWAVING CUSTOMARY LAW
A second area of mystery surrounding customary law is that concerning the basis of its binding character. Barberis has rightly pointed out that the traditional explanation of the Grundnorm as the ultimate source of such binding obligation is in itself a contradiction 17 . Indeed, to justify the binding nature of custom on the existence of another customary rule that so says is a rather circular argument. Yet, the very foundation of international law in Kelsen's theory of law is related to the ultimate existence of pacta sunt servanda as a rule of customary law 18 . The various theories that have been advanced to explain the nature of customary law reflect mostly a self-interested doctrinal approach that purports to justify a given view of the process, rather than to seek a real scientific answer to this difficult subject. The theory of pactum tacitum, while reflecting the need for State consent to be bound by a rule of customary law, takes this safeguard of sovereignty to the length that there would be no binding rule if such consent is not established directly or indirectly 19 ; it will seen that this is not actually the reality of customary law because that binding effect is in some aspects independent from the process of consent and admits exceptions thereto, albeit limited and legally precise.
In some aspects, the binding effect of a rule of customary law is independent from the process of consent. Customary law seldom needs consensus to come into being.
Consensus has been another favoured theory (Suy, en Bern. P. 208, n. 6) 23 , but this approach neither reflects the reality of how customary law is formed and applied. Seldom does customary law need consensus to come into being, although consensus might be achieved at a later point in the process, particularly in the context of a codification conference.
The role of natural law in explaining customary law does not lack interest 24 , but this relates either to historical elements influencing the formation of the international legal system or to the identification of rules that are fundamental for the international community, as opposed to ordinary rules. This in turn is the basis for the distinction between rules of constitutional international law and other rules that do not have such importance 25 . The significance of international constitutional law is gaining in importance as the global society evolves into a more structured community, and many such fundamental principles may be indeed embodied in customary law 26 . In this respect is should be noted that the International Court of Justice has not followed a consistent approach in dealing with customary law. During the period of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the early years of the present Court, consent or acceptance played an important role regarding the identification of customary rules. Thus, in the Lotus case emphasis was placed on the free will of States expressing principles of law though generally accepted conventions or usages 27 . In Asylum there was a ques- The ICJ has not followed a consistent approach in dealing with customary law.
In more recent times, however, it would seem that far from adhering to a given theory the Court has found a customary rule whenever and wherever it has deemed it necessary or convenient to identify such a rule or to go beyond treaty rules. It has been noted that in Nottebohm 32 and Barcelona Traction general rules seemed to have been enough, independently from acceptance 33 . More generally, opinio juris has been at the heart of many decisions, including the North Sea Continental Shelf, the Libya-Malta, and Nicaragua
34
, not understood as an indication of consent but in a rather loose manner that heavily departs from the practice of States. This last decision will be discussed further below.
This state of flux in the theory and practice concerning customary law lends itself to many possible interpretations. However, some of these interpretations will be made within the framework of law and its reasonable evolution and change and some other will be outside such bounds. The need to draw the line between one and the other then becomes essential for the stability of the legal system.
CONVENIENTLY PRACTICAL PRACTICE
It is an accepted element of customary law that it must be based on practice. But how much practice, how long, and how consistent it needs to be is a matter open to discussion. That is quite a legitimate discussion, but the problem is that it has ranged from those requiring just a handful of States to develop a practice serving as the basis for a customary rule, to those that require overarching majorities to this effect.
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Asylum Case, ICJ Reports, 1950, 266, at 276-278 , and discussion by Mendelson, supra note 19, at 181.
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Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951, 116, at 136-139, and Mendelson, supra note 19, at 182, with reference to the Nottebohm Case, ICJ Reports, 1955, 4, at 12-26. 3 3 Mendelson, supra note 19, at 182, with reference to the Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) Case, ICJ Reports, 1970, 3. 3 4 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, 3, at 44; Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) Case, ICJ Reports, 1985, 13, at 29-30; Nicaragua (Merits) Case, ICJ Reports, 1986, 14, at 97-101;  and discussion of these cases by Mendelson, supra note 19, [182] [183] It is beyond doubt that the participation of particularly interested States will be an essential requirement of the practice considered, as it has been rightly identified by the International Court of Justice 35 . The practice of these States will greatly influence the formation of a customary rule, but of course normally it will not be enough, as the participation of a relevant number of States will be required if that practice airns to reflect some degree of universality. How many is the relevant number is again open to discussion in the light of the specific matter concerned, but it cannot be as small as to result in a practice that is either unilateral, or the outcome of a very limited group of States, unless it is a case of particular or regional customary law. The sense of common direction in the international community is again the relevant factor, more than numbers themselves.
The number of States adhering to a certain practice will influence the information of a customary rule.
On the other hand, for some authors the discussion becomes a question of majorities versus minorities 36 . While the practice of States representing broad economic, political and legal systems might be desirable, it is by no means a requirement of the process. In this connection, the practice of fewer States might be relevant if it meets the conditions of density, significance and sense of direction noted above, even if a number of other States have either not participated formally or even might be interested in establishing a practice to the contrary. This was the situation underlying the dispute about new States being bound by rules of customary law in the formation of which they had not participated 37 . Although this particular dispute is no longer active, as it responded to a given moment of unsettled legal principles at the time of decolonization, it evidences the underlying dangers of uncertainty in the state of customary law.
It must also be noted that on occasions it is just the practice of one State that triggers the development of a process that will end up in the formation of a customary rule. This was the case, for example, of the United States in connection with continental shelf jurisdiction and of Chile in connection with the 200-mile maritime jurisdiction. How many States need to be added is a question not of majority but of sufficient strength as to make the practice viable in legal terms. In the case of the continental shelf, overwhelming support was achieved in a span of only few years. In that of the exclusive economic zone, the process gained strength 3 5
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, 3, at 43 , and discussion by Weil, supra note 13, at 166-167. See also generally Maurice H. Mendelson: "The Formation of Customary International Law", Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International, Vol. 272, 1999, 155-410. 3 6 Dissident Opinion of M. Lachs in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, 3, at 227 , as commented by Weil supra note 13, at 167. as a gathering storm, beginning with a few States in South America and extending to numbers in other continents; it could be ascertained that the practice had turned into customary law much earlier than a majority could be counted in, and in spite of the contrary practice and legal belief still maintained by a handful of other significant States, which in turn evolved gradually into the acceptance of the new practice or rule.
On occasions, the practice of one State triggers a process that leads to the formation of a customary rule.
Neither is there a need that practice be identical in every detail and expression 38 , yet it is necessary that there is a sense of common direction between participating States and entities. This is what Weil refers to as a practice sufficiently dense 39 . The fact that a State conduct to the contrary might be eventually present does not mean either that the conditions for the formation of a customary rule are not met 40 . Moreover, time might be a relative factor if it is evident that during the relevant period that practice has gathered sufficient strength. While custom concerning the laws of war took centuries to materialize that concerning the continental shelf took as noted just a few years. Historical acceleration is making the process faster, but in any event the essence of the question is that practice be real and meaningful.
ALL ABOARD
What is considered to be State practice is another issue related to this discussion. All types of evidence are occasionally taken into account, including treaties, legislation, resolutions of international organizations and many other diplomatic acts. Yet only some of these can be considered hard evidence, other are just a sort of soft evidence and still some are not evidence at all as there is no intention to follow such practice in any persistent manner. Resolutions of international organizations and conferences are some times riddled with this kind of problem, as will be discussed below. On the other hand, as noted by Barberis, it is not excluded that customary law may be based on the nega- The mystery surrounding customary law can be solved within the framework of legal reasoning.
However great the mystery surrounding customary international law might be it is still possible to solve it within the framework of legal reasoning. The problem becomes a serious one when the reasoning lies beyond that framework and pursues objectives other than the correct identification of a rule of law. That is no longer a legal exercise associated to the work of sources of international law.
A NON-OPINIONATED OPINIO JURIS
If practice is difficult enough to assess, the second element governing the formation of a rule of customary international law, namely opinio juris, has become still more unassailable. This is not the result of a particular legal difficulty, as it is quite evident that not any expression of practice can lead to the formation of a legal rule but this process requires the conviction that such a practice must be observed as a legal right or obligation in the belief that it is indeed an established legal rule. The difficulty found today is rather one associated with the interplay of the two basic elements.
A number of authors have been right in pointing out the contradiction that opinio juris entails as if this element is a requirement for the formation of a rule of law it is not quite easy to reconcile it with the need to believe that it is already a binding rule of law 44 . As explained by Kelsen in an early work, it is not possible to believe in the existence of a legal rule embodied in practice that in reality does not exist because opinio juris has not yet produced its effects 45 . But this apparent contradic- Barberis, supra note 17, at 27, with reference to Kelsen: "Théorie du droit international coutumier", Revue Internationale, 1939, at 263-264. tion can be explained in terms that customary law involves a process of interaction along time, during which practice gradually acquires a legal effect that opinio juris recognizes and at some point consolidates into a new legal rule.
There has been scepticism as to the actual need of opinio juris for the formation of a rule of customary law.
The evidence required to establish that the psychological element characterizing opinio juris is present or has been completed is indeed difficult if not quite impossible to attain. It is on this basis that many authors have been sceptical about the need for this element 46 or in any event for the need to prove it 47 . However, as aptly discussed by Barberis, there are in fact two types of practice that intervene in the formation of customary law 48 . The first is conforming to a practice believed positive by the community, while the second is that such a community can also react adversely to a practice that does not conform to their sense of legal commitment. Both types taken together do indeed provide a clear answer as to when and how opinio juris has intervened and performed its function in the formation of the customary rule. True as it is that it is difficult to know what States believe 49 , there is nonetheless a sense of legal attachment that allows to understand when a practice is devoid of legal effects and when it is the basis of a legal rule 50 . What cannot be explained is the view that as opinio juris is the expression of recognition of a pre-existing legal element embodied in practice, it suffices with practice for the formation of the rule and the role of opinio juris becomes unnecessary. The consequence of this approach is doubly negative. First, it allows to consider that just any practice can give rise to a new rule of law without a further filtering of its legal effects. Next, and worse, it allows to pick and choose what practice will be taken into account to reach a legal conclusion 51 , even if such a practice does not really reflect the consent of States or other subjects to engage in it with any legal conviction.
The practical result of this negative outcome is that treaties are occasionally taken to reflect customary law not only when they have been amply ratified and are fully in force but also when they have remained unratified or are still in the process of negotiation For a discussion of doctrinal developments in this respect, see Barberis, supra note 17, at 28-30. Weil, supra note 13, at 175.
State acts can indeed constitute practice, there is the added danger that any such practice might be taken to reflect customary law. Would this be the meaning of the acts of any State organ, including internal organs, or would it still be necessary to identify an extended and broadly accepted practice confirmed by the intervention of opinio juris?
The difficulty is of course compounded when also the acts of international organizations are taken into account as the expression of practice transformed into customary law 53 . There can be no doubt that the practice developed under international organizations can lead to the formation of a customary rule, but this is only when the participating States have had the specific intention of assigning to such a practice a legal effect, that is when opinio juris has intervened.
Professor Bernhardt has rightly explained that while there are no insurmountable dogmatic difficulties hindering the recognition of resolutions as elements in the formation of customary international law, a careful approach is necessary. To this effect the "context of the resolution, the surrounding circumstances, the number of positive votes, the absence of opposition and additional factors must be considered", including whether "the actual State practice outside the organization is in conformity with the resolution or at least does not exhibit a quite different picture" 54 . Even more caution is recommended in respect of the resolutions passed by international conferences 55 . This again is not just a question of majorities but of the intention surrounding the expression of that majority. There is indeed a number of situations in which the evident intent of the participating States and the majority vote is not to undertake a legal commitment by means of the adoption of resolutions, as happens with most of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. To extrapolate this phenomenon into customary law, and even include therein abstentions, will distort the process of genuine formation of a customary rule to the extreme 56 .
To proclain the existence of a customary rule where there is none leads to confusion. This is a position that not only States occasionally adopt in pursuance of given interests, however transitory they might be, but in which occasionally international and domestic courts and tribunals become themselves involved 57 . To proclaim the 5 3
Nicaragua case, supra note 38, at 100-103; The Rainbow Warrior case (cite), pars. 76 et seq., both as discussed by Weil, supra note 13, at 175-176.
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Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 216. Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 216.
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Weil, supra note 13, at 175-177. existence of a customary rule when there is none, or where practice is only remotely connected to the formation of such rule, is perhaps tempting so as to justify a decision in a given dispute, but in legal terms only greater confusion will ensue. The heavy reliance of the International Court of Justice on United Nations resolutions in Nicaragua is yet again a manifestation of this anomaly 58 and as such it has been the matter of heavy criticism 59 . A related consequence is of course that the stringent requirement of time in connection to the relevance of the practice in question will be significantly weakened 60 . Historical acceleration requiring a less prolonged period of time is perfectly real, as evidenced in the examples given above of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, but different is the omission of the relevant time altogether. The concept of instant or spontaneous custom noted above is inserted into this last situation 61 , as is the strong reaction that this approach has generated 62 . The famous expression of René-Jean Dupuy on "coutume sage et coutume sauvage" does indeed reflect the terms of the problem with due justice 63 .
PACTA SUNT NON SERVANDA
Once the logical sequence of events leading to the formation of a customary rule is altered, several other anomalies are to follow. One such contemporary anomaly is the relationship between custom and treaties. For long it has been acknowledged that treaties can embody and give written expression to rules of customary law either partially or in the broader context of the codification of customary rules 64 . In fact, the interrelationship between treaties and custom has been historically very strong, to the point that the very binding force of treaties depends on a rule of customary law, pacta sunt servanda, which as noted above has even been invoked as the ultimate justification of the whole legal system, both international and domestic
.
The interrelationship between treaties and custom has been historically very strong.
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Nicaragua, supra note 38, and discussion of the case by J. Verhoeven: "Le droit, le juge et la violence. Les arrêts Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis", Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1987, 1204, at 1206-1208. Weil, supra note 13, at 177-178. Weil, supra note 13, at 178-179 with discussion of critic literature. Tomuschat, supra note 26, at 257-259. Kelsen, supra note 18.
The problem lies, however, as noted by Weil 66 , in that expressions of jurisprudence 67 and the writing of authors 68 have supported the conclusion that beyond codification or the recognition of existing rules of customary law treaties can generate customary rules by a combination of practice and opinio juris which is largely selfcontained in the treaty or else can crystallize rules that are in the process of formation. True as it is that the line separating a treaty rule from a customary rule is often very fine, nonetheless one or the other can only be identified as law when the consent of States or other subjects has been properly given or at the very least the formative process has been completed.
It follows that if States have not expressed their consent to a customary rule by means of practice and opinio juris it cannot be held that such a rule exists as custom, even if a later treaty could have so proclaimed. The theory of the persistent objector that will be examined below rests in part on this premise. The view that consent can be de-linked from obligations arising at a later stage, particularly if majority interpretation intervenes, has not evidenced much support 69 . The process of formation of customary law cannot be governed by treaty, not even by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
70
, as it is only practice and opinio juris properly expressed that can give birth to the customary rule. The role of the treaty will be either to ascertain that this process has indeed been completed or else that the relevant practice is also embodied in that particular treaty.
Not even Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ can govern the process of formation customary law.
Precisely because consent is absent from unratified treaties or from treaties under negotiation is that these kinds of instruments cannot be taken to crystallize a rule of customary law, even less so to give birth to a new one. Moreover, treaties not yet in force pose a particular danger in that different States will invoke different provisions or their interpretation as customary law and no institutions or dispute settlement procedures will be available to settle the issue Weil, supra note 13, at 180-183.
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North Sea, supra note 34; Libya-Malta, supra note 34; Nicaragua, supra note 38; Tunisia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ICJ Reports, 1982, 18, at 23; and Gulf of Maine, ICJ Reports, 1984, 246 , at 294; all as discussed by Tomuschat, supra note 26, at 257-259. Barberis, supra note 17, at 37-38. Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 218.
In the light of this discussion it can only be concluded that it was not appropriate for the International Court of Justice to heavily bring into play and rely on a rule of customary law as an alternative to treaty arrangements in the Nicaragua case 73 . Politically convenient this approach might have been, but it reflects a profound alteration of the reasonable legal interaction between treaties and custom, so much so that two sources that have traditionally been considered hierarchical identical become subordinate one to the other 74 . One thing is to accept the simultaneous validity of a customary rule and a treaty rule 75 and quite a different thing is to have a customary rule overriding a treaty arrangement.
To accept the simultaneous validity of a customary rule and a treaty rule does not imply accepting that the former can override the latter.
There is still another difficulty emerging from these alterations that must be considered. Just as custom becomes blurred in the light of treaty arrangements that do not necessarily reflect a customary rule or does not so with the same meaning and extent, also treaty rules suffer from the same confusion as it will not be clear what is properly conventional law and what is customary law. The end result is that treaties loose the precision that supposedly is their advantage over customary law 76 . Then the interpretation and application of these various sources loose their rigor and allow for all sort of interests to take charge of a process that was until now governed by a scientific-legal method.
This is even more delicate in the light of the fact that the interpretation and application of customary law and conventional law do not follow the same methods and standards, as explained by the International Court of Justice in the very Nicaragua case 77 . The very essence of international law thus becomes uncertain and subject to manipulation by different interests 78 .
NON PERSISTENT OBJECTORS
Another consequence engendered by the alteration of the elements of customary law relates to the situation of third States in both the formation and the application of a rule of customary law. As mentioned further above, not all States are required to participate in the formation of a new rule by means of their practice and opinio juris. However, once the rule is 7 3
Weil, supra note 13, at 180-181. See the discussion of this relationship in Barberis, supra note 17, at 40. Weil, supra note 13, at 182-186. Weil, supra note 13, at 185. Weil, supra note 13, at 189. born it will normally be applicable to all States, irrespective of their participation or even of the fact whether they were in existence at the time the process of formation took place 79 . Provided the process is sufficiently representative of the legal sense of the community, individual participation is not a relevant factor for the determination of the existence of the rule. Customary rules thus become rules of general application or part of general international law.
Once the customary rule is born, it will normally be applicable to all States.
While the situation described might be the most common or usual, there are a number of important exceptions. There is first the exception of rules which are not general in character but involve a particular custom, such as rules of regional or bilateral customary law, where the participation of the States concerned and the evidence thereof will of course be a more stringent requirement for the proper formation of the rule in question 80 . Although it is debated whether consent and participation are different in respect of general and particular customary law 81 , the fact of the matter is that the more narrow the rule is the more close the connection with concerned States will need to be. The paramount requirement of consent in all respects was of course embodied in the Soviet theory of international law at the time of bitter East-West confrontation 82 , today not more than a historic reminiscence.
The second major exception is that concerning the persistent objector and the right to "opt-out" of an emerging customary rule. A State that has persistently opposed the formation of a rule of customary law since its inception will normally be beyond the reach of such rule however general its nature may be 83 . However, here again important alterations have intervened. A process that was supposed to be general in respect of the formation of the rule is now being turned into a process where the binding effects of the rule are also supposed to be general, thereby meaning that no exception could be ad-
Barberis, supra note 17, at 38-39. Elias and Lim, supra note 43, at 126-127, with particular reference to Thirlway's views arguing that there is no difference in this respect between general and particular law, at 126-127. The narrower the rule, the closer will need to be connection with concerned States.
In spite that scholarly criticism of this theory continues until this day 85 , in practice things have been different from theory. First, seldom has a State invoked the concept of persistent objector to escape the binding effect of a rule of customary law; it suffices to argue that the rule in question is not supported by sufficient practice or opinio juris and when things turn for the worse a State has normally rallied behind the new rule but purporting to influence a meaning and extent different from that which was originally envisaged 86 . Dupuy has rightly commented that "[e]n pratique, on a dû également constater que l'objection persistante est une arme que le temps, à lui seul, suffit à émousser, lorsqu'elle se heurte à la position déterminée de la majorité des Etats existants" 87 . The converse reality, however, is also true in that a persistent objection will many times be powerful enough to determine a change in the rule as originally envisaged and lead to a process of accommodation in which both the individual and the majority interests will attain a balance. This influence has not been deprived of success as many rules of customary law are today different from what they were or could have been at their inception and earlier State practice, as the case of the Exclusive Economic Zone and to some extent that of deep seabed mining show
88
. A second important difference between practice and theory concerns the question of jus cogens. It has been rightly held that no objection, however persistent, can have any effect if it affects the non derogation that characterizes a rule of peremptory international law 89 . There is of course a logical support for this view. If a rule is not subject to derogation, derogation cannot be permitted by the way of an exception.
The real question, however, is different. The rules of jus cogens that are fundamental to the international community and can be thus compared to rules of a constitutional hierarchy, have for long been incorporated as rules of customary law Weil, supra note 13, at 187-189, citation at 189. Weil, supra note 13, at 191-193 , with particular reference to the Asylum case, supra note 28, and the Fisheries case, supra note 29. Therefore, the question of a persistent objection to such rules does not arise. What happens is that there is a concerted effort to identify as rules of jus cogens propositions that have been hardly tested as to their acceptability and that are thus not peremptory or customary. But this is part of a different debate.
Customary law has been subject to a judicial and scholarly challenge of unprecedented proportions.
this mean that State participation can be
